Finding Strength in Alliance, not Autocracy

Western blocs are once again a fashionable target. This is the case for the EU which, across America and Europe itself, has been increasingly criticised, and even vilified, as faulty. Economic growth has been underwhelming (S8), a problem overshadowed by red tape, which consistently drags bureaucracy (S9). In a time of geopolitical volatility (S20), the failure of urgent collective decision making is a modern Achilles heel. The implied alternative, often hinted and sometimes stated, is that country focused, leader-driven models might deliver results more efficiently. 

This diagnosis is seductive, and mostly wrong, as Western alliances are not cooperative enough (S10). Fragmentation, divide and confusion dilute what is, on paper, a high-potential, developed alliance with a huge economy and the largest trading bloc in history (S7). The need to fulfil this potential is ever-more important to consolidate democracy's strength over autocracy. This can be seen presently and historically by observing the role of Russia. The EU plus its allies dwarf Russia economically (S15).  Russia’s economy is comparable in size to a mid-ranking European economy (S16), at first glance implying it is not a systemic economic rival. As such, the West’s weakness is not lack of capacity but lack of coordination.

Russia’s perceived strength rests less on economic fundamentals and more on military inheritance and nuclear deterrence. The gift of Mutually Assured Destruction from the Cold War still buys geopolitical relevance. (S5). But Russia's nuclear parity masks civilian fragility. Beneath the illusion of power and economic strength lies a population facing falling real incomes, distrust in its government, (S17) and heavy wartime resource diversion (S11).  Where democracies broadcast their economic frustrations loudly, autocracies suppress theirs quietly. Economic hardship can be easily overlooked but is no less real.

When criticising the EU, the recurring temptation is to go easy on its foil; the “benevolent autocrat” who cuts through institutional friction and governs for national prosperity. The backdrop of a tired nation even aided Putin's rise to power (S12).The promise of speed, clarity and direction is evermore desired in the West, demonstrated by the continued rise of populism (S18).  However, evidence suggests this style of leadership is flawed. Studies of authoritarian growth, which exemplify such characteristics, show that “growth-positive autocrats” appear as often as probability would predict by chance (S1). In other words, standout successes are statistical outliers, not proof of a superior governing model. Selectively pointing to China, Ethiopia, or Singapore (S13). (S14). is misleading and ignores the many unfruitful autocracies and the civilians who have suffered under their rule. 

The structural flaw is incentives: when power is unconstrained, corruption is rarely far behind.  As leaders begin to understand their power is weakening, their actions become increasingly rash, and the mask of the 'benevolent autocrat' falls.  Studies find that Russian regional governors grow more corrupt near the end of their terms (S2). Without strong institutions investment falls and distorted information leads to poor economic decisions. 

Democracies are not immune to poor policy (S19) and Western systems need reform. But they possess a strength that autocracies lack, self-correction without regime collapse. Transparency, opposition, and independent institutions lengthen political horizons and reduce the incentive to loot on the way out.

Alliances built on negotiation are slower than commands issued by decree. But they are also safer, more predictable, and ultimately more prosperous. The West’s problem is not too much democracy, it is too little alignment.